(R-R) (Avery)
Syntax vs. semantics
There are (at least) two approaches to mathematics (or life for that matter.) The syntactical approach, that looks at the form or format of things, and the semantical approach, that looks for substance, meaning, etc. Logic and much of computer science are syntactical, but of course once you have a syntactical theory, it is a theory, hence a meaningful theory, and hence it has meaning. In a sense, all of mathematics is syntactical, because it looks for the form of things. Marshal Mcluhan said that yesterday's form is tomorrow's content, and so on, so one has an infinite onion, and everything is both semantical and syntactical. In particular:
NOBODYHASAMONOPOLYONMEANINGANDINSIGHT.
One of the greatest triumphs of the syntactical approach is Schutzenberger's approach of coding combinatorial objects as words in formal languages. This was used very successfully by the bcole bordelaise (e.g. [9] ). Another major success, partially inspired by the former, is the beautiful combinatorial approach of Foata and the ecole lothariMgien to special function identities (e.g. [17] ). In it, one abandons the "analytical" meaning of special functions qua functions, and looks at the identities syntactically as a formal relations amongst formal power series, making issues of convergence superfluous, and, in fact, meaningless, since what used to be (real, complex, or whatever) variables, denoted by letters, become the letters themselves, i.e.
turn into (usually commuting) indeterminates. Then one introduces a combinatorial structure, for which the given relation is the "shadow", i.e. the weight enumerator, according to appropriate statistics. I should also mention the extremely fruitful species, pursued vigorously by the Ccole Quebecoise (e.g. [6] ) that once again, can be viewed both as a syntactical theory and as a semantical theory.
Semantical creatures always look for meaning and insight. Many times they find it, and it's great. Other times they find it, and who cares?, 50 pages of semantical conceptual abstract nonsense to "understand' some identity. Yet other times, the insight is completely in the beholder's eyes, like a Rorschach test.
Also, what constitutes "insight" is a matter of personal taste. To fancy algebraists,
INSIGHT = REPRESENTATION THEORY PROOF.
To combinatorialists, on the other hand,
INSIGHT = COMBINATORIAL (PREFERABLY BIJECTIVE) PROOF,
while some folks don't care at all about insight. They only care whether a result is true or false. Shalosh B. Ekhad belongs to the latter category. Take for example the good old Young-Frobenius identity n!= 1 .fJi.
(Y-F)
The representation theory proof says that both sides count the dimension of the regular representation of S,. The right side, because the multiplicity of the irreducible representation 2 in the regular representation equals its dimension f2. See Bruce Sagan's [30] recent beautifully written book.' The combinatorial proof of the Young-Frobenius identity is through the Robinson-Schensted bijection. The left-hand side counts the cardinality of S,, while the right-hand side counts the cardinality of pairs of tableaux of the same shape, having n cells. That they are equinumerous follows from the fact that they are in bijection. However, there is a short proof of this identity (due, I think, to Robinson, and that was shown to me a long time ago by Herb Wilf), that only uses high-school algebra. It goes as follows. First one proves Recall thatf, is defined as the number of standard tableaux of shape 2, or equivalently, the number of paths in Young's lattice % = A@) + jlCn-i) + %(n-2) + ... -+@ where II --f ,D means that p is a subshape of R, and they differ by one cell. They satisfy the obvious recurrence fA= c f*-.
Now one proves (*) by induction, using (**).
Now the summation set {A-+} is the set of all shapes obtained by deleting a cell and then adding a cell. This set is "almost" the set {A+-} obtained by adding a cell and then deleting one. Indeed if the deleted cell and the added cell are distinct, then there is a l-l correspondence between the action of delete-then-add and that of add-thendelete. The only possible discrepancy is when the added and deleted cells are the same. The number of ways of deleting a cell and then adding it back equals the number of distinct parts of the shape, while the number of ways of adding-then-deleting is the number of distinct parts plus one, since one can add a new row of one cell at the very bottom (and then delete it). So, as multisets, we have {/l'-}=%u(%-+}.
Putting this above, and using (**) once again, we get that
The readers are invited to show how (*) implies (Y-F). A careful scrutiny of the proof shows that it is in fact the "algebraization" of the Robinson-Schensted proof, and conversely, the Robinson-Schensted algorithm is the "bijectification" of the above proof.
A new science is born
I propose to start a new SCIENCE, to be called IDENTITY SCIENCE (IS for short). In it identities will be studied for their own sake, and one will try to use the minimum amount of concepts, at least of concepts from other parts of mathematics.
Grouptheoretical, combinatorial and other conceptual and insightful proofs will be banned, except when there is hope of stripping the foreign concepts away. This fanaticism will serve a very important purpose. I believe, with Hemingway, that less is more, and with modern painters and composers that extreme ugliness is beautiful. 
which is an easy, albeit human, exercise in using Lagrange interpolation: put p(x) = 1, and then x=0 in
It would be nice to define precisely a wide class of "Good" identities, perhaps those involving C and n a finite number of times, with the ranges of summation and product having a certain form, and make them shaloshable, perhaps by mechanizing Lagrange interpolation. The next level of identities are single sum binomial coeficient identities. These can always be written in the form cn = rL or more verbosely, +Em ,fi, R(n, k')=Constant* fi S(n'), II'= 1 where both R(n, k') and s(n') are rational functions of their arguments.
For example, the good old binomial theorem can be written as
The same "atomic" notation can be used for multi-sum binomial coejficients identities.
For example, the trinomial theorem can be written as
We now know' that
The format of the most common binomial coefficient identity is
are rational functions) and, to avoid pathologies like l/(n + k'), we also require that it's holonomic (see [40] ). For example
=2", ;(;)'=(2,"), ;(-""(.:"k)3=~.
Let's describe the WZ methodology [37] of proving such identities. First make the right-hand side as nice as can be:
Of course thou shalt not divide by zero, so if NICE is identically zero, then, just let it be. Now let's call the summand above F(n, k), and we have to prove that its definite sum from k= -co to k= co is identically 1 (or zero.) It turns out ( [36, 371) that there always3 exists a WZ mate, G(n, k), such that the following is true:
' [40-44,36, 371 (see also [2] ), but this goes back to my error-ridden Sister Celine paper [39] , in which I tried to show that "all binomial coefficients identities are trivial" by basing this on a formalization of Sister Celine's technique, that was done sloppily and inaccurately.
Recently Peter Paule pointed my attention to a paper by Verbaeten of 1974, [35] , that formalizes Sister Celine's technique correct/y. However both Sister Celine and Verbaeten were only interested injinding recurrence relations for polynomials.
The significance for proving identities was first realized in [39] . So were it possible to rewrite history, like it used to be in some countries, I would have rewritten [39] with full reference to [35] .
3 Well, almost always, and something more general, that still enables us to prove the identity, is always true, see [37, 411. Not only that,
META-THEOREM. FOR ANY GIVEN BINOMIAI COEFFICIENTS IDENTITY, VERIFYING (WZ) IS

APURELYROWTINEMATTER.
Proof. Dividing (WZ) by F(n, k), we have to verify
Since F is closed-form, and from the fact that G/F is a rational function, it follows that all the above ratios are rational functions, and hence the identity is routinely verifiable. 
Summing (WZ) with respect to k gives c F(
Since L(O)= 1 (check!), it follows that t(n)= 1. Cl All WZ proofs have the same monotone style, after all they were generated by a (deterministic) program. After a few identities they become repetitive. The only thing that changes is the input F(n, k) (given by the "theorem" part) and the corresponding output, G(n, k), that is always of the form R(n, k)F(n, k), for some rational function R(n, k). Assuming that the reader is familiar with the 'HZ methodology, that can be explained once and for all, all that the prover has to supply is the rational function R(n, k). Thus 
POL(n)L(n)+ POL'(n)L(n+ l)+ POL"(n)L(n+2)+ .** + POL(")(n)L(n+d=O.
4This is reminiscent of an old Jewish joke. The proud father of a newborn son wants to inform, via telegram, his father (the baby's grandfather), of the event, so that he can come to the brit (ritual circumcision.) The first version he had was: "Dear Papa, Please come to the brit of your newborn grandson". Since every word costs money, he is trying to see if he can make it shorter. First he gets rid of the words "Dear", then "please", then "Papa", then "newborn" (it must be newborn) then "grandson" (whoever heard of a brit for a daughter), and so on, until he gets the empty telegram. He then feels silly about sending an empty telegram, and forgets about the whole thing. Of course, the mistake was at the end. Had the grandfather received an empty telegram, it would have signaled to him that something important happened to his son, that necessitdted visiting him. Similarly, in the "even terser proof", one is not allc4wed to drop the YY, or if one has imperial tastes (see Paulos's masterpiece [29] ), the QED. The YY is the 'Nriter's word of honor that he actually ran the program, and it did produce a certain Rln, k).
Example.
It follows that all the identities of the form
are shaloshable. Just find recurrences for either sides and check whether they are the same, or at least "equivalent", and that the appropriate boundary conditions match. All the "hairy" parts in Apery's [4] proof that c(3) is irrational ([33]) are shaloshable (see [43] ). Indeed, Shalosh can prove in a few seconds that 
b(n):=; (i>' ( 'lkr
Proof. q
The WZ method, and the more general method of [41] found many new identities, in addition to proving many known ones (and being able to prove all terminating single-sum hypergeometric identities.) However, being "new" doesn't mean "interest- which he was unable to do by any of the previously known methods. The WZ method solved it in a few seconds.
Everything discussed so far applies just as well to q-analogues, except that the WZ miracle doesn't happen so often, and one does have to resort to q-creative telescoping
C381.
Definition. a(n) is q-nice if a(n+ 1) ----= RATIONAL(q, 4"). 44
The prototype of a q-nice function is the q-analog of n!:
(q)n:= (1 -q)(l -qZ)...(l-q") .
By the same token, a function F(n, k) of two discrete variables is q-nice if (R-R)
Well, not really. It would be a great moment for computerkind when Shalosh (or any of its brethren) will be able to generate a proof for un arbitrary identity of Rogers-Ramanujan type.5 There is no way that, today, Shalosh can prove (R-R) directly, since both left-hand side and right-hand side have no parameters to spare.
What Shalosh can prove is a more general (and hence easier) identity, stated (and, as it so happened, also first proved) by the human George Andrews (see [15] ):
= i (_l)jq(5j2+j)/2(q;q), k=O (q)k(q)n-k j=-n (4)nmj(4)n+j (R-R-finite) Shalosh and Sol also had to prove, and did prove, the following finite identity:
(Ys;q5)oj(q2;q5)~(q3;q5)n= f: The original Rogers-Ramanujan identity follows immediately upon letting n-t co in the above two shaloshable identities.
What's happening here? Shalosh cannot prove an identity a = b directly, so we need a human to conjecture a jnite form A(n)=B(n), which is shaloshable, and such that A( 00) = a, and B( co) = b. In the R-R case, in fact, the human had to conjecture two finite identities
such that C(co)=D(~o) and A( co)=a, B(co)= b. It might be that every identity of "Rogers-Ramanujan" type
where both t(k) and s(k) are "nice" (i.e. t(k+ 1)/t(k) and s(k+ 1)/s(k) are rational functions in (qk, q)) has corresponding "finite forms" which are, of course, shaloshable. Even if this is not the case in general, or if it is, but it's too hard to prove, it would be interesting to develop heuristics for "guessing" possible finite forms, which would then be routinely provable.
Going back to the ordinary case, the hypergeometric identity ([33])
5 It turns out that this problem was the seed to Paul Cohen's proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis. In his own words ([l, p. SO]): "Because of my interest in number theory, however, I did become spontaneously interested in the idea of finding a decision procedure for certain identities, such as the famous Rogers-Ramanujan identity. I thought that a procedure might exist analogous to, let's say, checking an identity in algebra between polynomials.
There are various famous identities involving formal power series," (_. .) "I saw that the first problem would be to develop some kind of formal system and then make an inductive analysis of the complexity of the statements. In a remarkable twist this crude idea was to resurface in the method of 'forcing' that I invented in my proof of the independence of the continuum hypothesis."
is not directly shaloshable, but the "finite form" which immediately implies it by taking N-CO, is shaloshable.
The complete elliptic integral of the first kind K(k) is nothing but *Fi(1/2, l/2; l;k2). It follows that the "exact evaluations" (see [31] , [7, p. 2981 ) at the so-called "singular values" are just certain infinite hypergeometric series that happen to be expressed in terms of T's at rational points. I conjecture that all these are just "tips of icebergs" of finite, shaloshable identities. To obtain the infinite series corresponding to the K(k) of interest, one would have, of course, to use Carlson's theorem (e.g. [S, p. 36ff I), but this is very standard. For example, the evaluations of the third singular value K(k,), is obtained by "plugging" n = -i in (the nonterminating extension of) the following shaloshable identity:
and K(k,) also have terminating versions. Shalosh, and its bigger siblings D.U. King and Ralbag, are now trying to find terminating versions of further evaluations, and also of Ramanujan's (1/99)4 famous formula for l/rc.
The next ten years of IS
IS should not be confined to any one kind of identities. The reason that I talked so much about hypergeometric identities is merely personal. We should try and find other kinds of identities that can be made shaloshable, either in principle, or better still, in practice.
Another worthy project, alluded to above, is to make shaloshable as wide as possible a class of rational function identities that will include the Good identity and its various analogs given by Gustafson and Milne [24] . In [45] terms. Although not routine (at present), it was nevertheless an easy human exercise in using Lagrange interpolation (see [38] ). I am almost sure that it is possible to give WZ proofs to all the multi-variate hypergeometric identities of Gustafson and Milne. Of course, discouering (i.e. conjecturing) the identities at the first place is a completely different matter, for which one needs human ingenuity and insight. Other multivariate identities one may want to WZ-ize are the beautiful multi-variate extension of Foata and Garsia [18] of the Mehler formula, the FoataaStrehl extension of the Hille-Hardy formula [19] , and Strehl's [32] many beautiful new multi-variate formulas given in his impressive Habilationsschrift.
A big terra incognita is a WZ approach to Gaussian sum analogs of hypergeometric and Barnes-type identities. The first to prove such an analog was Anna HelversenPasotto [25], which was a true landmark. Today this field is very active (e.g. [22] ) and so far I don't see how to WZ-ize it.
The quintessential holonomic sequence is n!. But what about (n!)!, ((n!)!)!, and so on. Perhaps one should define a whole hierarchy of "generalized holonomic functions". A function is 0-holonomic if it's a rational function. It's 1-holonomic if it's a solution of a linear recurrence equation whose coefficients are 0-holonomic functions (i.e. rational functions). So one can define r-holonomic functions as solutions of linear recurrence equations whose coefficients are (r -1)-holonomic functions. So much for single variable. For several variables, we would need some technical conditions to avoid pathologies. It would be interesting to develop a theory of identities for these higher holonomic functions.
Giidel and Turing (and later Hartmanis, Cook and Karp) taught us that computers cannot do everything. However, I bet that they can do many many more things than one imagines today. It would be fun to exploit the great power of our machines in innovative ways, that will show that they are far from just "dumb calculating jocks", but equal, and in many respects, superior, colleagues.
